

STATEMENT OF:
COLONEL MARTIN P. SCHWEITZER
COMMANDER, 4 / 82 AIRBORNE BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM
UNITED STATES ARMY
BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, TERRORISM & UNCONVENTIONAL
THREATS SUB-COMMITTEE AND THE RESEARCH & EDUCATION SUB-
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Introduction

Mr. Chairman and Ranking Members of the House Armed Services Committee and the Science & Technology Committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify how mission-critical Irregular Warfare, non-traditional, and non-kinetic enabling capabilities and technology are achieving desired **effects** in Afghanistan. Having just 10-days ago returned from a 15-month deployment in Afghanistan, let me first thank the Congress and the Nation for your continued support as we persevere against a determined, adaptable enemy. The context for my comments today will be the 4th Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 82d Airborne Division experience in Afghanistan, and specifically the significant non-kinetic effects the pilot Human Terrain System (HTS) program provided to our combat leaders at all levels within the Brigade.

Let me first explain what HTS is. It is a capability to assist Commanders and Soldiers to better understand the “human terrain” they are surrounded by and discern “soft power” means of achieving desired effects. It is built around a 5 to 8 person Human Terrain Team (HTT) at the Brigade Combat Team level comprised of social scientists, anthropological experts, and other trained military personnel. They use a Mapping Human Terrain Tool Kit (MAP HT) to assist with research and analysis and maintaining a human terrain data repository concerning local population social groups, interests, beliefs, motivating factors, leaders, etc. HTTs do not merely serve as embedded cultural advisors for BCT Commanders – but they assist Commanders at every level to maneuver formations within tribal communities in such a manner that reduces the threat to all involved parties. To help with this, there is a Theater-specific,

“Reach-Back Research Center” (RRC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, which provides 24/7 subject matter expert support for deployed teams.

So, what did all this mean for our deployment? It meant -- by better understanding the human terrain, we reduced the number of kinetic operations that otherwise would have occurred. Not only did we reduce the risk to our soldiers, but we reduced the risk significantly to the communities that we operated within. Subsequently, we were able to assist linking the people of Afghanistan to their government at an incredibly accelerated rate. Bottom Line: My Headquarters is uniquely qualified to focus on the enemy as the Center of Gravity. However, today the people are the Center of Gravity – not the enemy; and BCT Headquarters require enablers to optimize their effectiveness. One of these enablers is the HTS capability, which allows the Headquarters to better focus its efforts on the Center of Gravity.

Now, let me tell you what an HTT is not. The Team is not an intelligence-gathering tool which is used to “target” individuals. My Staff is uniquely organized to run the targeting process and link intelligence systems to time sensitive targeting. The HTT, sourced with Anthropologists and Social Scientists, is not qualified or trained to provide targeting support.

Last year, the Army fielded an HTT to my unit as a proof of concept. The HTT was immediately value added and became mission critical. The Team’s impacts were exponentially powerful: reduced our kinetic operations, assisted in developing more effective non-kinetic courses of action, improved the unit’s overall situational awareness, improved consequence management, increased host nation government

support, improved the Brigade's humanitarian assistance efforts, improved village assessments, improved information operations capabilities, decreased enemy forces attacks, and decreased ordinary crime in our area of operations. Without the HTT filter on courses of action and the alternative maneuver tools they identified to create the exact same effect, we would have lost double the lives. Using HTT capabilities, we reduced kinetic operations by 60-70%.

To illustrate the HTT's effectiveness, I would like to share a few vignettes:

- In the words of one of my company commanders, "Without the HTT, our actions would not have been as precise. If the [Team] weren't there, I would have cordoned off the village, gathered local elders and told them what we were doing, I would have told them to show me their personally-owned weapons, and if they didn't show us their weapons we would [have] taken them. Because of the HTT, I understood my alternatives. If you could have one for every company command, they would be a phenomenal asset."
- According to the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Commander, "Their [HTT] expertise rapidly identified who to talk to in the village. We were just ricocheting around before they got here, talking to random people. HTT saved me an enormous amount of time – 10-20 hours per village -- in terms of who to talk to. I would take those guys any day of the week."
- The HTT helped the 203rd Afghanistan National Army (ANA) Corps and our Brigade develop non-kinetic courses of action. To provide a specific example: in Ghazni Province, the Taliban had regularly attacked the Government of Afghanistan leaders, Coalition, ANA and Afghanistan National Police for over five years, despite a

very aggressive outreach effort to village elders. The HTT questioned the use of kinetic Courses of Action in the area, observing that the true power brokers in the area were the mullahs, and not the village elders (who were mostly Taliban supporters). After redirecting their outreach effort to the mullahs, the Brigade experienced a rapid and dramatic decrease in Taliban attacks, to the point where this area is currently attack free. Bottom-line: “For five years, we got nothing from the community. After meeting with the mullahs, we had no more bullets for 28 days; captured 80 Afghan-born Taliban ... and 32 Foreign Fighters. As a result of this operation last June, Ghanzi Province no longer harbors the “shadow Taliban government – it no longer exists.”

What was the net effect? When we took over in early 2007, only 19 of 86 formal and informal districts supported the government. Today, we assess 72 of those same Districts support their government. I absolutely attribute some of that change to the HTT.

I could elaborate with more metrics and examples of HTT success, but let me conclude. We learned that the population is the key Center of Gravity, the enemy is hiding “among the people,” and we must understand the culture to win. However, it is more than just the culture; it is understanding their norms and values from an operational standpoint that creates a bridge between the people and their government, which currently does not exist. The HTT’s contribution to Brigades’ ability to assess their operating environments, to routinely develop and consider non-lethal input to military planning, and to achieve greater operational success with less kinetic operations is invaluable.



COL MARTIN P. SCHWEITZER



Colonel Martin Schweitzer, a 1985 graduate of Old Dominion University was commissioned in the Infantry.

After attending the Infantry Officer Basic Course and Ranger School, his initial duty assignment was 1-8 Infantry, 4th ID, Fort Carson Colorado from 1985 – 1988. There he served as a Platoon Leader, Executive Officer, and Battalion Maintenance Officer. Upon graduation from the Infantry Officer's Advanced Course in 1989, he was assigned to 2nd Battalion, 504th PIR, 82nd ABN Div where he served as the Battalion Assistant S3 and Charlie Company Commander. Following Rifle Company Command he was assigned as the Commandant of the Advanced Airborne School. His follow-on assignments were to Indiana University ROTC Department (1993-1995) and the Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth KS (1996). He was then assigned to the Southern European Task Force (SETAF), Vicenza, Italy from 1996-1999 and served as the SETAF Plans Chief, Battalion XO for 1st Battalion, 508th PIR, and the BDE S3 for the SETAF Infantry BDE. Upon return from overseas he served as the Aide de Camp, Commander, Training and Doctrine Command and then commanded 3-505, 82nd Airborne Division from 2001 – 2003. Following an assignment to the Joint Staff, Joint Operations Directorate, Operations Officer, CENTCOM, he attended the National War College (2006) where he was recognized as a Distinguished Graduate. Colonel Schweitzer has a Master Degree in Instructional Systems Technology, Department of Education from Indiana University and a Masters Degree in National Security Strategy from the National War College, Wash DC.

Colonel Schweitzer has participated in Operation Just Cause, Operation Desert Shield, Operation Desert Storm, Operation Guardian Assistance, Operation Guardian Retrieval, and Operation Enduring Freedom II. He just returned from OEF VIII after a 15 month deployment where he Commanded Task Force Fury in Eastern Afghanistan.

Currently, he is the Commander, 4th BCT, 82nd Airborne Division.

Among his decorations are the Bronze Star (3rd Award), Defense Meritorious Service Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal (6th Award), the Joint Commendation Medal (2nd Award), the Army Commendation Medal (4th Award), the Joint Achievement Medal, and the Army Achievement Medal (4th Award). He also earned the Combat Infantryman's Badge (2nd Award), the Ranger Tab, and the Master Parachutist Badge with Combat Device.

Colonel Schweitzer is married to Sarah Schweitzer of Richmond, Virginia. They have two Sons, Michael and Connor and a daughter, Clare.